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Abstract  
The economic crisis has revealed the extent to which sustaining the key tenets of the 
‘Common Sense Revolution’, implemented by the Conservative government of Premier 
Mike Harris, have eroded the fiscal capacity of Ontario. The proposal to freeze public 
sector wages and the ensuing consultation with public sector unions and employers in 
the spring/summer of 2010 signal Ontario is about to return to the rollback 
neoliberalism that dominated the 1990s. The difference between now and then is the 
more defensive posture of organized labour and the limited capacities that exist to 
resist such an assault.   
 
Résumé 
La crise économique a révélé l’étendue avec laquelle le maintien des principaux 
principes du ‘Common Sense Révolution’, introduits par le gouvernement conservateur 
du Premier Mike Harris, a érodé la capacité fiscale de l’Ontario. La proposition de geler 
les salaires de la fonction publique et la consultation qui s’ensuivit avec les syndicats et 
les employeurs du secteur public au cours du printemps et de l’été de 2010 indiquent 
que l’Ontario est sur le point de retourner au néolibéralisme qui dominait les années 
1990. La différence entre aujourd’hui et hier est la position plus défensive du 
mouvement syndical et les capacités limitées qui existent pour s’opposer à une telle 
attaque.   
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A	recent	issue	of	The	Economist	observed	that	industrial	relations	were	
once	again	back	at	the	centre	of	political	debate.	Unlike	the	battles	of	the	
1980s,	this	one	pits	public	sector	workers,	with	their	superior	wages,	job	
security	and	pensions,	against	everyone	else	(The	Economist	6	January	
2011a).	Of	course,	this	latest	criticism	of	public	sector	compensation	fails	
to	acknowledge	how	30	years	of	falling	union	density	and	
deindustrialization	in	the	private	sector	has	contributed	to	this	growing	
gap.	Ontario’s	2010	Budget	signalled	such	a	confrontation	was	looming	in	
that	province.	A	seven‐year	program	of	public	expenditure	constraint	was	
announced	and	legislation	introduced	freezing	the	incomes	of	350,000	
non‐union	and	management	public	sector	workers	for	two	years.	
Moreover,	the	unions	representing	the	remaining	700,000	public	sector	
workers	were	invited	to	engage	in	a	social	dialogue	process	that	would	
lead	to	a	negotiated,	and	voluntary,	two‐year	wage	freeze.	Comparison	
with	the	New	Democratic	government’s	Social	Contract	was	inevitable	but	
this	was	no	replay	of	that	fateful	exercise.	
	 This	paper	will	situate	the	compensation	restraint	consultation	as	
the	opening	shot	in	what	will	inevitably	lead	to	a	deepening	of	public	
sector	austerity	in	Ontario.	The	origin	of	this	current	episode	of	fiscal	crisis	
can	be	found	in	the	Liberals’	fidelity	to	the	fiscal	policies	of	the	Common	
Sense	Revolution.	For	their	part,	labour’s	political	defensiveness,	
sectionalism,	and	compressed	political	horizons	have	presented	the	
Liberals	with	a	reluctant	ally	with	few	existing	capacities	for	resistance.	
And	finally,	the	legalization	of	labour	relations	has	in	this	instance	further	
demonstrated	that	there	is	no	alternative	to	class‐based	mobilization	and	
organization	in	building	a	political	alternative	capable	of	offering	up	
serious	resistance.		
	
A Flawed Design or a Process for Charter‐Proofing? 
The	scope	of	Ontario’s	broader	public	sector	and	the	complexity	of	the	
labour	relations	environment	is	illustrated	with	a	few	statistics.	As	of	25	
October	2010,	there	were	3,893	collective	agreements	covering	844,796	
workers	represented	by	no	fewer	than	79	unions.	Some	of	the	largest	
sectors	are	primary	and	secondary	teachers	(180,604	in	five	unions),	
school	support	workers	(74,672	in	nine	unions),	Ontario	Public	Service	
(50,893	in	five	unions),	hospital	nurses	(53,264	in	two	unions),	hospital	
support	workers	(85,507	in	16	unions),	nursing	homes	(48,466	in	20	
unions),	community	services	(34,337	in	26	unions),	and	municipal	(70,289	
in	11	unions)	(Ontario	Ministry	of	Labour	25	October	2010).		This	
organizational	diversity	is	further	complicated	by	differing	internal	
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structures	and	political	practices	both	between	and	within	unions.	Some	
unions	have	centralized	decision‐making	structures,	others	less	so.	And	
politically,	some	unions	have	drifted	closer	toward	the	Ontario	Liberals	as	
a	consequence	of	the	decline	of	New	Democratic	electoral	fortunes	and	the	
enduring	threat	posed	by	the	populist	Right	Conservatives.		
A	Labour	Relations	Secretariat	was	created	to	provide	“strategic	
analysis	and	advice	to	the	government	concerning	Broader	Public	Sector	
(BPS)	labour	relations”	and	to	co‐ordinate	the	consultative	process.	The	
invitation	to	bargaining	agents	and	employers	stated	the	purpose	of	the	
consultations	was	“to	provide	opportunities	for	Broader	Public	Sector	
bargaining	agents,	employers	and	the	Government	to	engage	in	a	dialogue	
about	how	we	can	work	together	to	manage	compensation	expense	in	a	
fair	manner	that	protects	key	public	services”	(Labour	Relations	
Secretariat).		
The	consultations	began	9	August	and	concluded	3	October	2010,	
and	were	organized	into	three	phases	consisting	of	a	number	of	tables.	
Each	table	was	composed	of	representatives	from	several	unions,	sector	
employer	associations,	and	government	spokespeople/negotiators.		A	
general	conclusion	was	that	the	design	of	the	consultation	process	was	not	
suited	to	trade	unions	spanning	sectors	and	sub‐sectors	and	the	diversity	
of	decision‐making	traditions	and	structures	employed.	Some	were	highly	
centralized	and	cohesive	while	others	were	highly	decentralized.		
Moreover,	various	consultation	tables	brought	together	unions	and	
employer	associations	that	were	seen	to	have	a	“common	interest”	but	this	
was	rather	unwieldy.	These	sessions	were	shared	with	other	cross‐sector	
delegations	from	the	Service	Employees	International	Union	(SEIU)	and	
the	Canadian	Autoworkers	(CAW)	as	well	more	localized	university	faculty	
associations	and	other	unions	representing	public	service	professionals	
such	as	lawyers,	engineers,	doctors,	and	policy	analysts.		The	goal	for	each	
table	was	to	negotiate	a	“framework	agreement”	that	could	be	
implemented	locally.	This	was	highly	problematic	given	the	number	of	
unions	representing	workers	in	discrete	sectors	such	as	education	and	
health.	An	employer‐side	labour	law	firm	noted	how	this	design	would	
make	it	very	difficult	to	arrive	at	a	framework	agreement.	How	employers	
in	different	sectors	would	be	able	to	negotiate	with	unions	representing	
workers	in	different	sectors	was	an	open	question	unless	the	negotiations	
were	structured	by	sector,	such	as	health,	education,	core	public	service	
(Kennedy	2010).	The	Canadian	Union	of	Public	Employee’s	(CUPE’s)	
position,	like	that	of	the	Ontario	Federation	of	Labour,	was	that	all	unions	
representing	workers	in	a	sector	should	meet	together	with	the	employer	
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and	government	representatives.	This	was	the	structure	of	the	process	
used	during	the	Social	Contract	negotiations	which	proved	very	difficult	for	
many	of	the	employers	as	one	veteran	government‐side	negotiator	from	
that	time	has	suggested.	The	finance	minister,	Dwight	Duncan,	responded	
to	CUPE’s	proposal	saying	that	other	unions	(it	has	been	suggested	these	
were	Ontario	Public	Service	Employees	Union	(OPSEU),	the	Ontario	
Nurses’	Association	and	the	SEIU)	did	not	agree	with	such	an	approach	and	
that	this	model	had	been	tried	by	the	New	Democratic	Party	(NDP)	in	1993	
to	well	known	results.	The	sectoral‐based	consultative	model	was	not	
generally	adopted	but	the	consultations	with	CUPE	proceeded	to	break	out	
into	sector	tables:	hospitals,	long‐term	care/community	care,	education,	
social	services,	and	municipal.	
CUPE’s	strategy	in	negotiations	was	to	centre	the	conversation	on	
defending	public	services.	The	Ontario	Council	of	Hospital	Unions	(OCHU)	
tabled	five	demands	it	considered	key	to	the	agenda	of	defending	public	
services.		These	included	a	five	year	moratorium	on	each	of	the	following:	
1)	hospital	and	emergency	room	closures;	2)	expansion	of	public‐private	
partnerships;	3)	reductions	in	the	number	of	hospital	beds	and	services;	4)	
privatization	of	hospital	services	and	5)	competitive	bidding	in	the	
homecare	sector.	As	reported	by	other	participants,	the	government	
representatives	tended	to	be	rather	junior	and	inexperienced	and	“it	
seemed	they	did	not	want	to	deal.	There	were	never	any	tradeoffs”	as	one	
participant	said.	After	two	weeks	the	government	produced	a	draft	
Framework	Agreement	that	did	not	include	any	of	the	key	issues	raised	by	
the	union.	Indeed	the	“taboo	subject”	as	one	trade	union	participant	called	
it,	was	the	government’s	corporate	tax	reduction	policy.		Government	
representatives	emphasized	this	was	not	negotiable.		
There	were	other	problems	both	for	the	government	and	the	unions	
that	were	initially	more	open	to	engaging	in	a	consultation.		OPSEU’s	
governing	Executive	Board	was	split	at	its	13	September	2010	meeting	
where	9	of	19	Board	members	voted	against	continuing	in	the	consultation	
process.	Those	opposed	to	the	participation	argued	for	sending	a	message	
of	defiance	to	the	government,	while	others	saw	defiance	as	pointless.	The	
majority	(10‐9)	opinion	was	that	participating	in	the	consultations	
protected	the	union	on	both	the	legal	front	(any	refusal	to	participate	in	the	
consultations	could	become	evidence	in	a	future	court	case,	to	the	union's	
detriment)	and	on	the	public	relations	front	(if	the	government	was	
seeking	to	orchestrate	a	public	fight	with	unions	to	shore	up	its	support	on	
the	right).	OPSEU	President	Smokey	Thomas's	presentation	to	the	
government	keyed	in	on	the	corporate	tax	cuts.	Despite	the	division	on	
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consultation	tactics,	the	Executive	Board	voted	unanimously	to	support	the	
union's	campaign	efforts	to	oppose	the	wage	freeze.	That	led	to	an	
extensive	mobilization	in	the	period	of	November	2010	to	January	2011,	
with	OPSEU	mobilizers	making	more	than	250	presentations	to	locals	and	
holding	more	than	40	demonstrations.	This	campaign	explicitly	linked	the	
wage	freeze	to	corporate	tax	cuts.	The	campaign	subsequently	morphed	
into	“People	for	Corporate	Tax	Cuts,”	an	online	campaign	supported	by	
advertising	in	key	Liberal‐held	ridings	around	the	province.	Extensive	
consultations	with	eight	other	unions	had	failed	to	arrive	at	an	agreement	
on	a	cross‐union	campaign.	
The	opposition	to	the	process	within	OPSEU	further	held	that	the	
union’s	top	leadership	was	interested	in	pursuing	sector	agreements	with	
the	government	and	that	participation	would	lend	the	process	legitimacy.	
“The	strategy”,	as	an	OPSEU	activist	characterized	it,	“was	to	publicly	
oppose	the	wage	freeze	but	privately	to	go	back	to	the	table	and	construct	
an	agreement	by	sector”.	Therefore,	the	“opposition”	in	OPSEU,	refused	to	
support	breaking	out	into	sector	tables	as	CUPE	had	done.	Some	were	of	
the	view	that	the	only	table	where	there	appeared	to	be	an	employer	
mandate	to	actually	negotiate	was	that	of	the	Ontario	Public	Service.	The	
SEIU	agreed	to	participate	in	the	process	in	“good	faith”	on	the	condition	
that	a	strategic	discussion	on	home	care	issues	be	included	in	the	
negotiation.	This	would	include	such	issues	as	the	future	of	competitive	
contracting,	successor	rights,	compensation	for	travel	time	and	mileage,	
and	for	standardization	and	increases	in	pay	rates	for	home	care	workers.	
A	“Framework	for	Continued	Discussions”	was	eventually	arrived	at	but	no	
further	substantive	discussions	ensued.	
And	here	is	the	zero	sum	of	the	government’s	strategy:	that	
protecting	public	services	was	contingent	upon	an	effective	wage	cut	for	
public	sector	workers.	This	was	not	an	acceptable	first	principle	for	many,	
if	not	all,	of	the	unions	given	the	commitment	to	continue	with	reducing	
corporate	taxes.	Had	the	government	been	open	to	entertaining	a	range	of	
truly	negotiable	outcomes	perhaps	this	would	have	been	a	viable	first	
principle.	At	the	same	time,	the	unions	and	even	more	critical	elements	
within	the	unions,	did	not	pursue	a	campaign	of	resistance	that	would	
reach	deeper	within	the	unions	themselves	and	beyond	to	other	allies,	both	
real	and	potential.		As	in	the	case	of	OPSEU,	the	split	is	based	on	internal	
leadership	politics	rather	than	substantive	ideological	differences.	One	
activist’s	observation	was	that	the	question	of	“collaboration	with	the	
Liberals	is	a	wedge	issue”	for	the	faction	opposed	to	president	Smokey	
Thomas.	This	is	far	from	the	more	overtly	class	politics	pursued	by	David	
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Rapaport’s	2007	campaign	for	union	president.	Nonetheless,	these	
consultations	took	place	within	a	political	and	historical	context	where	the	
governing	Liberals,	no	longer	enabled	through	an	expanding	economy,	
found	their	project	running	up	against	the	enduring	constraints	
established	in	the	first	years	of	the	Harris	government.	
	
Ontario’s Third Way: In the Long Shadow of the Common Sense Revolution 
Canada’s	provinces	have	responsibility	for	delivery	of	core	welfare	state	
public	services	most	notably	health,	education,	social	assistance	and	a	
myriad	of	social	services	that	taken	together	compose	the	heart	of	
Ontario’s	redistributive	social	policies.	The	financing	of	these	services	
requires	more	than	70	percent	of	total	provincial	expenditures.		
Consequently,	fiscal	policy	is	particularly	reflective	of	the	distribution	of	
class	and	sectional	power	in	the	provincial	state.	The	2003	election	of	the	
decidedly	“social	investment	state”	(Perkins,	Nelms,	and	Smyth	2004)	
Liberals,	was	greeted	as	a	departure	from	neoliberalism.	It	certainly	was	a	
departure	from	the	open	class	warfare	of	the	Harrisite	Common	Sense	
Revolution,	but	any	suggestion	that	the	arrival	of	the	Liberals	marked	a	
rupture	from	neoliberalism	is	entirely	based	on	a	few	redistributive	
measures,	modest	reinvestment	is	public	services,	and	certain	labor	law	
reforms	that	improved,	but	did	not	fully	roll	back	the	Harris	governments	
“reform”	of	labour	policy	(Bartkiw	2010).	
The	Liberals	differentiated	themselves	from	the	Conservatives	by	
contrasting	their	proposals	to	reinvest	in	public	services	and	restore	social	
peace.	However,	fiscal	conservatism	and	balanced	budget	orthodoxy	would	
remain	intact.		The	Liberal	platform	committed	to	“keeping	taxes	down”	as	
“Ontario	workers	and	their	families	already	pay	enough”	(Ontario	Liberal	
Party	2003.	Book	#3,	5)	and	maintain	balanced	budgets.		The	Conservative	
plan	to	further	cut	corporate	taxes	was	firmly	rejected.		In	contrast,	the	
Liberals	argued	“corporate	taxes	are	already	competitive”	and	that	
proceeding	with	tax	cuts	that	would	bring	Ontario’s	corporate	income	tax	
25	percent	below	that	of	its	American	Great	Lakes	states	competitors	
would	“compromise	our	ability	to	make	investments	that	increase	our	
productivity”	(5).		At	the	same	time	the	Liberals	drew	a	sharp	contrast	
between	their	approach	of	establishing	Ontario’s	competitive	advantage	
through	investments	in	support	of	skills	and	knowledge	acquisition	as	
opposed	to	the	policies	of	the	Harris‐Eves	governments’	“race	to	the	
bottom”	policy	of	tax	cuts	(7).		Each	party	presented	different	visions	of	the	
neoliberal	project.	For	the	Liberals	the	provincial	state	had	a	strategic	role	
in	enabling	a	‘high	road’	progressive	competitiveness	policy	through	
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policies	serving	to	enhance	human	capital	formation	(skills	training,	post‐
secondary	education)	and	sector	specific	investments	in	research	and	
development	and	providing	incentives	for	investment	in	strategic	areas	
(Albo	1994).	
From	their	first	days	in	government	the	Ontario	Liberals	expressed	
a	willingness	to	frame	reinvestment	in	public	services	together	with	calls	
for	public	sector	workers	and	their	unions	to	restrain	demands	at	the	
bargaining	table.	In	other	words,	the	maxim	that	there	is	a	trade‐	off	
between	protecting	and	expanding	public	services	and	the	wages	and	
salaries	paid	to	public	sector	workers,	was	established	early	on	in	the	
Liberals	first	term	with	the	prospect	of	“McGuinty	Days”	(Livingstone	
2004).		And	the	premier	wrote	in	a	press	statement	that	“We’ve	got	to	do	
more	than	just	increase	wages”	(Urquhart	2004,	F2).		One	cabinet	minister	
noted	that	expenditures	for	compensation	accounted	for	75	percent	of	the	
money	the	province	transferred	to	the	broader	public	sector	(Brennan	and	
Benzie	2004,	A1).	There	was	no	escaping	the	wage	question.		Rather	than	
rolling	back	the	personal	and	corporate	tax	cuts	to	address	the	$5.6	billion	
deficit	the	Liberals	inherited	from	the	Conservative	government,	the	first	
Liberal	budget	would	signal	a	continuation	of	the	Common	Sense	
Revolution’s	policy	of	public	sector	austerity.	
The	first	Liberal	budget	focused	on	the	tattered	state	of	Ontario’s	
public	services.	The	“One	Ontario”	rhetoric	of	the	campaign	was	re‐
engaged	with	the	finance	minister	stating	there	would	be	no	further	
“irresponsible	tax	cuts”	that	benefited	a	few	and	undermined	the	capacity	
“to	provide	public	services	for	all”	(Ontario	Budget	2004	Speech,	1).		
Reinvestments	key	areas	of	only	modestly	reflated	the	public	economy.		
The	Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives	(CCPA)	concluded	that	the	
program	and	capital	spending	planned	for	2002‐3	composed	11.9	percent	
of	Ontario’s	GDP.	The	Liberals’	2004	budget	expanded	this	to	12.5	percent	
of	GDP	(Ontario	Alternative	Budget	2004,	5‐6).	The	Liberal	promise	to	
rebuild	public	services	was	predicated	on	balancing	the	budget	and	
freezing	taxes	by	flat‐lining	or	cutting	the	budgets	of	non‐priority	
programs.		Ontario’s	public	sector	unions	were	enraged.		A	spokesperson	
for	the	Ontario	Public	Service	Employees	Union	(OPSEU)	said	of	the	
budget:	“The	first	Liberal	term	in	office	is	looking	a	lot	like	what	a	third	
Tory	term	in	office	would	look	like”.		The	Conservative	government’s	
corporate	income	tax	cuts,	which	the	Liberals	in	opposition	and	through	
the	election	had	so	roundly	criticized,	were	left	in	place.	And	Ontario’s	
most	vulnerable,	the	social	assistance	recipients	who	had	their	benefits	cut	
by	more	than	21	percent	in	1995	and	frozen	from	that	point	forward,	were	
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effectively	left	with	a	35	percent	rate	cut	based	on	the	1993	rate	levels	
(CCPA	2004,	3).		In	this	context,	the	Liberal	2003	win	can	be	understood	as	
a	defeat	of	an	openly	class	warfare	style	of	neoliberalism	but	did	not	mark	
the	defeat	of	neoliberalism	itself.		The	continuity	in	a	fiscal	policy	of	tax	
cuts	is	the	unquestionable	source	of	Ontario’s	chronic	revenue	shortfall	
(CCPA	2007,	7).		
	
Ontario’s Exit Strategy: Consolidating Austerity 
The	2010	budget	delivered	on	March	25	was	an	expression	that	the	cost	of	
the	Great	Recession	would	not	be	equally	shared.	Just	as	evidence	was	
mounting	for	the	corporate	sector’s	return	to	profitability,	the	cost	of	the	
crisis	was	shifted	onto	the	public	sector.	The	“we’re	all	in	it	together”	
rhetoric	and	style	that	has	been	the	Ontario	Liberal	trademark	has	arrived	
at	an	impasse.	The	2010	budget	forecasted	7	years	of	austerity	extending	
to	2017‐18.	This	can	only	be	achieved	through	a	dramatic	shrinking	of	
Ontario’s	public	sector	from	a	current	19.2	percent	of	GDP	to	15.5	percent	
in	2017‐18.	This	translates	to	a	20	percent	contraction	of	Ontario’s	public	
sector,	consolidating	it	at	a	size	that	corresponds	to	that	which	existed	at	
the	height	of	the	Common	Sense	Revolution	(TD	Economics	25	March	
2010,	1).		Moreover	a	massive	privatization	of	public	assets	including	the	
liquor	control	board,	the	Ontario	Lottery	and	Gaming	Commission,	public	
electricity	producers	and	distributors	was	suggested	but,	at	least	for	the	
moment,	not	acted	upon	(Evans	and	Albo	2010,	2).	
The	2010	budget	is	most	noteworthy	for	singling	out	the	
compensation	paid	to	public	sector	workers	as	the	most	serious	
component	of	the	fiscal	crisis.	The	Public	Sector	Compensation	Restraint	to	
Protect	Public	Services	Act,	in	one	motion,	made	three	points	for	the	
government.	By	freezing	the	incomes	of	non‐union	public	sector	workers	
and	political	staff,	they	picked	the	‘low	hanging	fruit’	or	in	other	words,	the	
easiest	group	to	regulate.		Second,	from	a	pure	retail	politics	perspective,	
the	action	suggested	the	government	was	prepared	to	be	tough	with	public	
sector	workers.	And	third,	the	government	sidestepped	a	confrontation	
with	the	public	sector	unions,	a	group	it	had	been	building	political	capital	
with	since	the	1999	election.		
The	argument	for	a	wage	freeze,	followed	by	a	protracted	period	of	
restraint,	was	situated	within	the	global	economic	crisis.	The	government	
contended	that	reinvestment	in	public	services	and	expansion	of	public	
sector	employment	was	enabled	by	strong	revenue	growth.	The	economic	
crisis,	however,	“opened	a	significant	fiscal	gap”	causing	revenues	to	
decline	and	expenditures	to	rise	as	stimulus	spending	rolled	out	
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(Government	of	Ontario	July	2010).	The	government	position	was	based	on	
three	general	points.	The	first	cited	inflation	within	the	public	sector.	From	
2003‐2010,	the	Ontario	government’s	program	expenditures	grew	at	an	
average	annual	rate	of	6.6	percent	and	this	was	in	part	driven	by	wage	
settlements	averaging	3	percent	per	year.	This	was	compared	to	private	
sector	wage	settlements	of	2.1	percent.	The	accumulated	wage	growth	for	
the	public	sector	for	the	period	2004‐09	was	18.8	percent	compared	to	
13.7	percent	for	the	private	sector.	Furthermore,	the	government	argued,	
the	annual	average	rate	of	growth	for	public	sector	workers	has	
accelerated	significantly,	from	1.9	percent	in	1991‐95	to	2.9	percent	in	
2004‐09.	Public	sector	wage	increases	and	investments	in	public	services	
were	enabled	by	strong	revenue	growth	that	averaged	8.7	percent	between	
2003‐04	and	2007‐08.	Second,	the	accumulated	cost	on	interest	in	public	
debt	was	cited	as	a	serious	problem	serving	to	crowd	out	the	capacity	to	
spend	on	public	services.	Allowing	the	annual	deficit	to	continue	
unaddressed	would	only	expand	the	accumulated	debt	and	thus	the	cost	of	
borrowing	to	service	the	interest	and	principal	of	that	debt.	The	finance	
ministry	projected	that	interest	on	this	accumulated	debt	would	grow	at	an	
annual	rate	of	12	percent	between	2009‐10	and	2012‐13.		This	translates	
into	an	annual	increase	in	interest	charges	of	$3.6	billion.	By	2012‐13,	
Ontario	will	be	paying	$12.5	billion	in	annual	interest	payments.	And	third,	
with	a	fiscal	plan	to	balance	the	budget	by	2017‐18,	program	expenditure	
growth	can	be	no	more	than	an	average	1.7	percent	annually	until	2013	
and	no	more	than	1.9	percent	after	that.	Given	that	the	factors	feeding	into	
program	expenses	are	many	with	compensation	being	only	one	factor,	
there	is	very	little	room	to	accommodate	anything	more	than	the	most	
modest	of	wage	increases.	Indeed,	the	government	noted	that	future	
spending	will	be	very	tight.	The	budget	plans	for	no	more	than	1.9	percent	
in	program	expenditure	growth.	Subtracting	1.2	percent	from	this	to	
simply	meet	the	growing	demand	for	public	services	due	to	population	
growth,	left	a	mere	0.7	percent/year	to	finance	any	additional	costs	
including	wages.	And	the	core	principle,	for	the	government,	was	that	tax	
rates	must	remain	competitive	to	attract	investment	(Ministry	of	Finance	
FAQ	2010,	1;	Government	of	Ontario	July	2010).	Budgets	reveal	political	
choices.	Where	Manitoba	halted	further	cuts	in	the	corporate	income	tax	
rate,	Ontario	unflinchingly	proceeded.	Ontario’s	ongoing	plan	to	cut	
corporate	taxes,	from	14	to	10	percent,	once	fully	implanted,	will	result	in	
the	loss	of	$4.5	billion	in	revenue	(Ministry	of	Finance	2010a,	vii).	The	
aggregate	revenue	loss	as	a	consequence	of	combined	personal,	corporate	
and	other	tax	cuts	totals	$18	billion	(Mackenzie	2010,	8).		
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Business	economists	and	consultants	have	contended	that	the	
disparity	between	public	and	private	sector	compensation	requires	
redress.	Consulting	firm	KPMG	presented	a	strategy	to	use	the	current	
fiscal	crisis	as	a	stage	to	comprehensively	re‐write	the	public	sector	
employment	contract	across	the	globe.		The	report’s	main	finding	is	that	
public	sector	managers	are	not	sufficiently	prepared	to	undertake	the	
restructuring	KPMG	sees	as	necessary.	It	notes	that	“a	major	component	of	
public	sector	costs	are	wages…the	public	sector	could	cut	back	on	human	
resources”	a	point	to	which	a	KPMG	executive	is	cited	as	saying	“it	makes	
sense	not	to	do	something	yourself	that	somebody	else	can	do	for	a	third	of	
the	cost”	(KPMG	International	2009,	15).	Not	surprisingly,	a	significant	
turn	to	public‐private	partnerships	and	outsourcing	is	recommended.		A	
TD	Economics	Report	largely	echoed	these	same	themes	noting	that	while	
the	current	crisis	in	public	finances	would	likely	not	be	as	bad	as	that	of	the	
early	1990s,	the	exit	would	take	longer	require	fiscal	discipline	and	a	
restructuring	of	public	services	delivery	(TD	Economics,	2009).	Similarly,	a	
joint	study	by	KPMG	and	a	University	of	Toronto	policy	centre	noted	the	
gap	in	compensation	between	public	and	private	workers.	The	response	to	
this,	the	report	recommends,	is	to	lower	the	cost	of	wages	and	benefits	in	
the	public	sector	“because	it	furthers	equity	objectives”	(Mowat	Centre,	
School	of	Public	Policy	and	Governance,	KPMG	2010,	22).	Confronting	the	
cost	of	public	sector	labour	is	key	to	restructuring	the	cost	of	public	
services	(15).	Pensions	provide	a	perfect	fault‐line	to	divide	public	and	
private	sector	workers.	Given	that	78	percent	of	Ontario’s	public	sector	
workers	participate	in	a	defined	pension	plan,	in	contrast	to	25	percent	of	
private	sector	workers,	one	can	see	why	the	pensions	issue	presents	a	
political	opportunity	to	the	ruling	class	and	their	governmental	allies	to	
frame	this	as	an	‘equity’	issue.	A	recent	survey	of	Canadian	deputy	
ministers	suggested	a	protracted	recession	would	magnify	the	“growing	
gap	between	traditional	protections	of	the	public	service	(job	security,	
defined	benefit	pensions)	and	the	insecurity	of	the	private	sector”	(IPAC	
2009,	6).			
	
The Compensation Restraint Consultations: Protecting Public Services or 
Electoral Strategy? 
The	unions	representing	public	sector	unions	were	divided	internally,	and	
between	one	another	over	strategy	and	whether	or	how	to	engage	in	the	
consultation	process.	The	CAW	left	the	process	on	the	first	day	but	not	
before	stating	they	were	attending	only	to	gather	information	and	not	to	
bargain.	Other	unions,	or	sub‐sectors	within	unions,	saw	this	as	an	
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opportunity	to	push	beyond	austerity	and	present	alternatives	that	
challenged	government	fiscal	policy	and	the	lack	of	democracy	in	public	
sector	workplaces	–	the	point	where	public	services	come	face	to	face	with	
citizen‐users.	For	finance	minister	Dwight	Duncan	the	objective	was	a	two‐
year	wage	freeze	that	would	both	protect	public	services	and	stimulate	
economic	growth.	Duncan	set	the	context	as	one	where	tax	revenues	had	
dropped	12.2	percent	and	real	GDP	declined	by	4.7	percent.	Yet	growth	in	
demand	for	public	services	means	that	expenditures	will	continue	to	
increase	by	4.4	percent	in	health	and	3.7	percent	in	education.	
Accommodating	this	growth	within	the	constraints	of	the	fiscal	plan	means	
there	is	no	capacity	to	increase	allocations	for	compensation.	Citing	other	
jurisdictions	such	as	California	and	New	York	where	public	services	have	
been	slashed	and	state	workers’	pay	cut,	Duncan	explained	that	Ontario	
had	chosen	a	different	path.	But	with	55	percent	of	all	public	program	
expenditures	directed	to	compensation,	there	was	no	evading	the	wage	
relationship	(Duncan	20	July	2010).	Of	course,	other	revenue	options	were	
not	for	consideration.		
Given	the	economic	and	fiscal	context,	one	would	think	that	this	was	
a	serious	effort.	Yet	one	union	participant	likened	the	process	to	the	1993	
film	Ground	Hog	Day	where	the	key	characters	are	caught	in	a	time	loop	as	
events	repeat	themselves	day	after	day.		Participants	reported	there	
appeared	to	be	no	real	mandate	or	desire	to	negotiate	an	agreement.	Three	
hypotheses	explain	this.	First,	the	design	of	the	consultative	process	was	
not	suited	to	the	complexity	and	diversity	of	representation	in	Ontario’s	
public	sector.	Second,	it	was	fundamentally	a	political	tactic	designed	with	
Ontario’s	October	2011	election	in	mind	and	sought	to	simultaneously	
consolidate	the	stable	and	warm	relationship	with	a	labour	movement	that	
feared	the	Tories	more	and	assuage	fiscally	conservative	opinion.	And	
third,	the	entire	process	was	a	prelude	to	legislative	intervention	and	
followed	the	direction	established	by	an	earlier	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	
decision	that	ruled	as	unconstitutional	a	government	of	British	Columbia	
legislative	intervention	in	a	health	care	strike.	And,	not	insignificantly,	a	
fourth	goal	might	be	added	which	is	the	process	focused	attention	on	the	
wages	paid	to	workers	rather	than	on	corporate	tax	cuts.	And	so	both	
public	opinion	and	union	expectations	could	be	managed.	
Taken	in	total,	the	process	lacked	rigour.	The	constraint	proposal	
was	designed	at	the	highest	levels	of	the	Ontario	state,	specifically	within	
the	Premier’s	Office	by	David	Jean,	deputy	chief	of	operations	and	a	key	
political	strategist,	together	with	the	finance	ministry.	That	it	so	rapidly	
wobbled	without	attracting	much	senior	ranking	attention	would	suggest	
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that	a	decision	to	allow	the	process	to	meander	to	a	conclusion	was	made	
early	on.	The	obvious	explanation	is	that	the	most	senior	ranks	of	the	
public	service	were	not	concerned	with	achieving	a	negotiated	outcome.	
Rather	the	goal	appears	to	have	been	to	be	to	check	“did	consultation”	off	
the	Charter‐proofing	checklist.					
	
The Liberal‐Labour Alliance: The Longer Shadow of the Social Contract 
The	experience	of	an	NDP	government	was	mixed	for	Ontario’s	trade	
unions	but	ultimately	the	Social	Contract	Act	forced	approximately	half	of	
the	trade	unions	in	Ontario	to	withhold	support	for	the	NDP.	The	result	
held	far‐reaching	consequences.	As	journalist	Thomas	Walkom	wrote:	“In	
1990,	the	New	Democrats	were	the	only	serious	political	force	remaining	
on	the	left	wing	of	Canada’s	political	landscape.	When	they	abandoned	that	
terrain	they	did	not	just	leave	it	empty.	They	sowed	the	ground	with	salt”	
(Walkom	1994,	269).	The	result	has	been	that	since	the	late	1990s,	given	
the	rupture	with	the	NDP	and	that	party’s	dramatically	reduced	electoral	
fortunes,	various	unions	have	drifted	toward	a	political	entente	with	the	
Liberals	marking	the	revival	of	a	modernized	Gomperism	(Evans	and	Albo	
2007,	6).	But	the	emergence	of	a	twenty‐first	century	Liberal‐Labour	
alliance	is	much	more	than	a	return	to	pragmatic	business	unionism.	
Rather	it	is	an	important	symptom	of	an	ideological	divide	expressing	the	
trade	union’s	adaptation	to	the	conditions	of	neoliberalism	in	turning	to	
defensive	tactics	and	strategies.			
An	explicit	example	of	this	was	the	formation	of	the	Working	
Families	Coalition	(WFC)	in	the	run	up	to	the	2003	election.	Composed	of	
the	CAW,	two	teachers’	unions,	International	Brotherhood	of	Electrical	
Workers	(IBEW),	and	the	building	trades,	the	electoral	strategy	of	the	WFC	
“was	to	actively	campaign	against	the	governing	Tories,	and,	in	the	process,	
implicitly	encourage	support	for	the	Liberal	Party”	(Walchuk	2010,	38).	
The	unions	did	not	affiliate	to	the	party	but	provided	both	direct	financial	
support	and	conducted	a	“third	party”	campaign.	This	has	been	identified	
as	the	emergence	of	“middle	class	unionism”	where	such	unions	tend	to	be	
industry	or	profession	specific	with	no	interest	in	organizing	outside	of	
that	sector	and	are	prepared	to	strike	alliances	with	the	Liberals	over	
investment	in	their	specific	sector	(43).		The	Liberals	have	made	health,	
education	and	infrastructure	investment	the	centrepiece	of	their	policy	
agenda	and	thus	forms	the	material	basis	for	a	progressive	
competitiveness	alliance	with	specific	sectors.			
This	partial	but	substantive	political	realignment	offers	at	least	
partly	explains	why	the	Liberals	did	not	pursue	a	more	aggressive	
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approach,	including	rollback	legislation.	One	union	participant	
characterized	the	entire	process	as	being	about	polling	and	triangulation:		
	
They look tough but actually don’t do anything. This is not about money but 
politics. The triangulation is that the Liberals can say we are not the NDP and 
we’re not the Common Sense Revolution, We’re the Third Way. The Fall 
Statement covered their Left flank. Everyone does not want this to be a replay 
of 1995 leading to another Mike Harris.  
	
While	the	Liberals	had	cultivated	allies	within	several	of	the	key	public	
sector	unions,	most	notably	the	education	unions	and	the	Ontario	Nurses	
Association,	any	intervention	in	bargaining	would	swiftly	chill	those	
relationships.	They	further	understood	their	fidelity	to	fiscal	conservatism	
would	be	a	source	of	tension	with	the	public	sector	unions	but	avoiding	the	
wage	question	will	be	impossible.	
Since	2002,	the	majority	of	Ontario	trade	union	members	work	in	
the	public	sector	and	by	2010	accounted	for	57.9	percent	of	all	union	
members	in	the	province	(Statistics	Canada	CANSIM	Table	282‐0077).	This	
shift	reflects	the	declining	union	density	rate	in	the	province’s	private	
sector.		In	2009,	a	mere	15	percent	of	private	sector	workers	were	
unionized	compared	to	70.5	percent	of	public	sector	workers	(CLC	2010).	
This	shift	in	the	centre	of	gravity	of	the	trade	unions	has	significant	
political	implications	and	sets	the	Liberals,	or	whoever	wins	the	October	
2011	election,	on	a	collision	course	with	the	public	sector	unions.	This	last	
bastion	of	trade	union	strength,	the	very	sector	the	“Third	Way”	Liberals	
have	given	a	strategic	role	to	in	advancing	their	progressive	
competitiveness	agenda,	must	at	some	point	become	the	site	of	a	serious	
contestation	between	the	unions	and	forces	seeking	to	broaden	neoliberal	
restructuring	through	the	Ontario	public	sector.	Oddly,	much	as	social	
democracy	everywhere	began	to	falter	when	it	turned	to	public	sector	
austerity	and	neoliberal	restructuring,	undermining	its	effective	raison	
d’être	in	the	trade	unions	and	welfare	state,	the	Ontario	Liberals	are	now	
travelling	toward	a	similar	denouement.			
Public	opinion	gives	the	triangulation	hypothesis	some	greater	
traction.	A	number	of	unions	collectively	hired	market	research	firm	Vision	
Critical	to	survey	the	attitudes	of	Ontario	citizens	toward	a	range	of	
political	and	austerity	policy	issues.	The	results	revealed	a	variety	of	
contradictory	views	but	also	signaled	to	the	unions	that	public	opinion	was	
far	from	sympathetic.	The	overall	assessment	of	the	McGuinty	government	
was	not	encouraging.	Seventy‐three	percent	of	respondents	indicated	they	
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were	very	or	somewhat	dissatisfied	with	the	McGuinty	Liberals.	The	same	
number	viewed	the	McGuinty	government	as	moving	in	the	wrong	
direction.	A	significant	public	sector/private	sector	divide	respecting	the	
performance	of	the	government	was	revealed	where	43	percent	of	public	
sector	workers	were	broadly	satisfied	with	the	government	compared	to	
only	23	percent	of	private	sector‐employed	respondents.		In	other	words,	
three‐quarters	of	private	sector	respondents	were	less	than	favourable	
toward	the	government.	And	with	respect	to	the	recession	and	Ontario’s	
fiscal	crisis,	73	percent	supported	the	proposal	that	the	public	sector	
unions	had	a	responsibility	to	assist	with	the	economic	recovery.	The	same	
number	expressed	support	for	a	two‐year	public	sector	wage	freeze.	
However,	this	is	not	to	say	Ontarians	are	a	monolithically	conservative	
bloc.	The	reality	is	somewhat	more	nuanced.	For	example,	while	22	
percent	of	respondents	favoured	a	reduction	in	government	spending,	a	
comparable	21	percent	preferred	an	increase	in	program	spending.	Forty‐
seven	percent	were	inclined	to	neither	increase	nor	cut	public	spending	
but	rather	maintain	the	current	levels	of	expenditure.	And	in	terms	of	
support	for	various	measures	to	tackle	the	deficit,	a	rather	egalitarian	
preference	was	expressed	with	79	percent	supporting	increasing	taxes	on	
the	banks	and	financial	industry	and	in	favour	if	increasing	corporate	
taxes.	And	77	percent	supported	a	10	percent	high‐income	surtax	on	those	
earning	$300,000/annum	(Vision	Critical	2010).		
The	electoral	calculation	cannot	be	diminished.	The	Liberals	could	
not	accede	to	stop,	let	alone	roll	back,	the	corporate	tax	cuts	or	pursue	a	tax	
on	high	income	earners,	and	thus	risk	alienating	a	key	part	of	their	political	
base	and	nor	could	they	move	to	legislate	and	set	in	motion	a	confrontation	
with	the	public	sector	unions.	The	teachers’	unions,	and	the	Ontario	
Secondary	School	Teachers’	Federation	in	particular,	had	threatened	to	
actively	oppose	the	Liberals	if	there	was	any	attempt	to	legislate	a	freeze.		
And	with	eyes	on	succeeding	McGuinty	as	party	leader,	Dwight	Duncan	no	
doubt	saw	an	opportunity	to	consolidate	labour	support	for	his	leadership	
bid	by	not	energetically	pushing	the	process	forward.										
	
Lesson from the Constitutionalization of Politics: Real Protection is Class 
Mobilization 
It	has	been	suggested	that	the	intent	of	the	Ontario	government’s	
consultation	was	to	provide	a	forum	for	limited	dialogue	before	moving	to	
legislatively	intervene	and	apply	the	Public	Sector	Compensation	Restraint	
to	Protect	Public	Services	Act	to	the	unionized	public	sector	workforce.	This	
understanding	derives	from	a	2007	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	decision	
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(Health	Services	and	Support	–	Facilities	Subsector	Bargaining	Association	
v.	British	Columbia,	2007	SCC	27)	that	found	sections	of	British	Columbia’s	
Health	and	Social	Services	Delivery	Improvement	Act,	2002	(Bill	29)	to	have	
violated	the	Charter’s	guarantee	of	freedom	of	association.		The	decision	
thus	extended	a	limited	constitutional	protection	to	collective	bargaining.	
The	decision	appeared	to	pierce	Panitch	and	Swartz’s	permanent	
exceptionalism	thesis	that	legislative	interventions	into	collective	
bargaining	had	become	a	fixture	in	Canadian	labour	relations	(2003).	This	
is	not	the	case	as	this	decision	heralds	less	an	end	to	unabashed	state	
intervention	seeking	to	roll‐back	gains	made	through	collective	bargaining	
and	more	of	a	limit	on	how	the	state	may	proceed	to	do	so.	
Bill	29	allowed	for	extensive	privatization,	elimination	of	services,	
enabled	hospital	closures	with	as	little	as	2	months’	notice,	and	stripped	
out	protection	from	contracting	out	and	for	successor	rights,	bumping,	and	
retraining	and	job	placement	(Camfield	2006,	14).		British	Columbia’s	
thoroughly	neoliberal	Liberal	government	defended	their	draconian	
intervention	on	the	grounds	it	was	necessary	to	address	a	“crisis	of	
sustainability	in	the	provincial	health	care	system”	(Etherington	2009,	
723).		The	Health	Employees’	Union	and	the	British	Columbia	Federation	of	
Labour	responded	both	politically	and	legally	to	this	attack.	The	legal	
challenges	also	failed	at	the	B.C.	Supreme	Court	and	the	B.C	Court	of	
Appeal.	However,	the	ultimate	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	decision	provided	
an	important	but	limited	victory	that	“effectively	prohibits	‘substantial	
interference’	in	free	collective	bargaining	without	‘good	faith’	negotiation	
and	consultation”	(CAW	2010).		The	decision	requires	“both	employer	and	
employees	to	meet	and	to	bargain	in	good	faith,	in	the	pursuit	of	a	common	
goal	of	peaceful	and	proactive	accommodation”	(B.C.	Health	Services,	2	
S.C.R.,	90).	In	this	sense,	the	protection	is	limited	to	a	process	of	
consultation	and	not	a	substantive	outcome	such	as	preserving	existing	
protections	and	benefits	(Etherington	2009,	715;	Norman	2008,	19).		As	
such,	the	SCC’s	decision	“simply	shields	public	sector	unions	from	the	
worst	excesses	of	neoliberalism”	(Savage	2009,	16).		Therefore,	this	does	
not	strictly	prevent	a	government	from	intervening	legislatively	to	
undermine	collective	agreements	(Tucker	2008,	158).	In	other	words,	
nothing	in	this	decision	stops	the	rolling	back	of	existing	collective	
agreements	providing	this	takes	place	“at	the	conclusion	of	a	process	of	
consultation	with	the	union”	(Savage	2009,	15).		The	question	then	is	what	
will	the	Supreme	Court	decide	the	next	time	a	government	raises	the	
spectre	of	fiscal	crisis	as	it	moves	to	undermine	existing	collective	
agreements?	The	answer	will	depend	“on	the	extent	to	which	future	courts	
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take	an	unduly	narrow	reading	of	the	decision	as	simply	imposing	a	mere	
consultation	requirement	on	government’s	before	over‐riding	collective	
bargaining	rights”	(Savage	2009,	16).			
By	the	end	of	2010	in	Ontario,	with	the	constraint	consultations	
concluded,	there	were	no	agreements	save	with	the	Ontario	Provincial	
Police	and	government	lawyers,	and	these	settlements	hardly	conformed	
to	the	zero/zero	objectives	the	government	sought.	The	Rae	NDP	
government	moved	to	legislate	when	it	was	clear	that	a	freely	negotiated	
social	contract	was	not	to	be.	Not	so	in	Ontario	today.	Was	this	meaningful	
consultation	that	would	satisfy	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada’s	decision?	In	
all	likelihood,	if	there	is	to	be	legislation,	it	will	not	be	introduced	until	
after	the	October	2011	election	regardless	of	who	wins.	But,	parsing	the	
finance	minister’s	“thank	you”	to	participants,	a	number	of	messages	are	
conveyed	revealing	how	the	government	understands	the	process.	In	his	
letter,	Duncan	states	“all	parties	…	now	have	a	better	understanding	of	
each	other’s	expectations	and	of	the	current	fiscal	challenge”	and	further	
“we	cannot	ignore	the	simple	fact	that	55	percent	…	of	all	government	
program	expenses	go	to	compensation	…	we	can	only	manage	the	deficit	by	
also	addressing	the	single	biggest	line	item	in	our	budget	–	public	sector	
compensation”.	And,	finally,	“we	expect	all	parties	to	continue	recognizing	
the	fiscal	situation	facing	the	province	and	to	continue	to	seek	ways	to	
comply	with	the	Policy	Statement”	(Ministry	of	Finance	2	November	2010).	
The	messaging	is	clear:	we	better	understand	the	fiscal	problem;	public	
sector	compensation	cannot	be	ignored;	and	all	parties	will	continue	to	
consider	the	zero/zero	objective.						
	
Conclusion: Beyond Sectionalism and Toward Resistance 
The	Liberal	government	has	framed	constraining	public	sector	
compensation	as	central	to	Ontario’s	exit	strategy	from	the	fiscal	crisis.	The	
failure	of	the	consultation	process	to	arrive	at	widespread	framework	
agreements	across	the	public	sector	is	not	even	the	point.	The	Supreme	
Court’s	decision	respecting	British	Columbia	health	care	workers	offers	
only	limited	guarantees	respecting	consultation	and	this	has	been	arguably	
achieved.	What	is	in	play	is	pure	electoral	strategy	on	the	part	of	both	the	
Liberal	party	and	the	unions.	The	Liberals	cannot	afford	to	alienate	their	
support,	uneven	and	variable	in	depth	as	it	may	be,	among	the	public	
sector	unions	given	recent	polls	show	them	trailing	the	Conservatives	by	
10	or	more	points.		Given	this	electoral	calculus,	the	unions	fear	a	return	to	
the	Common	Sense	Revolution.		John	Wilkinson,	a	minister	in	McGuinty’s	
cabinet,	suggested	early	in	the	process	that	Ontario’s	public	sector	unions	
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would	co‐operate	with	the	government	on	the	wage	freeze.		That	clearly	
has	not	happened,	at	least	not	explicitly	so.	But	it	cannot	be	denied	there	
was	hardly	a	trade	union	common	front	on	this	matter.	As	several	
participants	to	the	process	commented	there	was	very	little	co‐ordination	
or	political	strategizing	among	the	unions.	Instead,	sectionalism	prevailed	
as	a	result	of	political,	ideological	and	bargaining	territory	differences	
(Gindin	and	Hurley	2010).		But	the	result	of	the	now	deeply	embedded	
defensiveness	of	the	trade	unions	is	an	ongoing	inability	to	raise	larger	
questions	that	are	less	sectional	in	nature	and	significantly	more	political.	
Doing	so	would	force	unto	the	agenda	the	need	to	democratize	the	state,	
and	how	it	delivers	public	services,	and	the	economy	as	a	whole	(Gindin	
Leftstream	video	2010).		
While	defending	wages	will	clearly	remain	an	issue,	it	has	been	
proposed	that	the	strategic	issue	for	public	sector	unions	will	involve	
reframing	the	debate	around,	and	leading	in	the	struggle	for,	the	
improvement	and	democratization	of	public	services	(Gindin	and	Hurley	
2010).	Indeed,	CUPE’s	hospital	sector,	while	not	surrendering	to	demands	
that	compensation	be	off	the	table,	advanced	this	very	argument.	The	
unions	proposed	their	own	alternative	fiscal	strategy	including	proposals	
to	cancel	the	corporate	income	tax	reductions,	a	financial	transactions	tax,	
and	the	establishment	of	a	new	top	personal	income	tax	threshold	that	
would	raise	an	estimated	$2	billion	in	new	revenue	alone	(McCarthy,	
Sanger,	Stanford	and	Weir	2010,	23‐26).		In	October	2010,	OPSEU	launched	
a	membership	mobilization	campaign:		“Invest	in	Ontario	–	Stop	the	
Corporate	Tax	Cuts”,	that	urges	members	to	lobby	Members	of	the	
Provincial	Parliament	(MPPs)	to	reconsider	corporate	tax	cuts	at	the	
expense	of	public	services.	The	Liberals	however,	have	been	unwavering	in	
their	public	position,	as	expressed	in	the	finance	minister’s	“thank	you”	
memo	that	states	compensation	remains	at	the	centre	of	this	discussion.	
Given	this	uncompromising	line,	the	public	sector	unions	can	rely	on	
nothing	less	than	a	class‐based	mobilization	around	their	alternative	
proposals	to	protect	public	services	and	those	who	produce	them.		The	
campaigns	run	by	certain	unions	have	been	directed	toward	members	
only.	While	at	the	time	of	the	2010	budget,	a	number	of	unions	did	begin	a	
process	of	cooperation	but	this	rapidly	faded.	Indeed,	one	activist	said	
efforts	to	launch	a	multi‐union	campaign	against	the	corporate	tax	cuts	in	
the	autumn	of	2010	gained	no	traction.		Part	of	OPSEUs	campaign	seeks	to	
popularize	the	anti‐corporate	tax	cut	sentiment	reflected	in	public	opinion	
polling	but	this,	while	creative	and	commendable,	will	be	limited	by	the	
constraints	of	a	one‐union	campaign.	Something	akin	to	the	Coalition	of	
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Resistance	Against	Cuts	and	Privatisation	in	Britain	that	brings	together	a	
broad	alliance	of	social	forces	to	oppose	this	next	phase	in	the	
neoliberalism	is	a	political	necessity.	Given	the	succeeding	waves	of	
restructuring	that	have	swept	through	the	private	sector	over	the	past	
quarter	century,	and	consequently	the	lives	of	private	sector	workers,	it	
will	be	imperative	that	a	movement	to	defend	public	services	and	public	
sector	workers	not	simply	be	a	defense	of	the	status	quo.		Private	sector	
workers,	union	and	non‐union	are	key	to	political	success	and	therefore	
the	yet	to	be	founded	‘coalition	of	resistance’	must	be	as	effective	and	
creative	as	the	populist	Right	has	been	in	speaking	to	the	anxieties	of	
workers	in	all	sectors.	The	emerging	issues	are	centred	on	public	sector	
productivity	(code	for	rationing,	flexibilization	and	work	intensification)	
and	parity	with	the	wages	and	working	conditions	found	in	the	non‐union	
private	sector.	The	National	Union	of	Public	and	Government	Employees’	
(NUPGE)	campaign	“For	Public	Services	and	Tax	Fairness”	is	a	national	
effort	to	counter	the	view	that	there	is	a	structural	fiscal	crisis.	While	it	too	
is	isolated	and	has	not	received	a	great	deal	of	publicity,	the	fiscal	crisis	
affects	all	provinces	and	any	mobilization	of	resistance	will	need	to	be	
constructed	nationally.			Anything	less	than	such	a	broad‐based	resistance	
mobilized	around	an	explicitly	anti‐neoliberal	program,	will	result	in	a	
version	of	the	Irish	Croke	Park	deal	where	the	dominant	faction	of	
Ireland’s	trade	union	movement,	more	comfortable	as	a	very	junior	
partner	in	the	management	of	Irish	capitalism	than	as	a	force	of	resistance,	
agreed	to	a	policy	agenda	that	destroys	working	class	lives.						
	
A Note on Methodology 
Several	participants	to	the	consultation	process	provided	much	of	the	
information,	data	and	interpretation	presented	here.		Protecting	the	
anonymity	of	these	individuals	is	essential	and	therefore	neither	their	
names	nor	affiliations	can	be	disclosed.		
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